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EQUALITY, "ANISONOMY," AND JUSTICE: A
REVIEW OF MADNESS AND THE
CRIMINAL LAWt
Andrew von Hirsch*

CRIMINAL LAW. By Norval Morris. Chicago
and London: The University of Chicago Press. 1982. Pp. ix, 235.
Cloth, $20; paper, $8.95.

MADNESS AND THE

Norval Morris's latest book, Madness and the Criminal Law, is
not exclusively addressed to that topic; much of its subject matter is
sentencing theory. Morris defends, and elaborates upon, the conception of criminal sentencing that he first espoused in his influential
book of a decade ago, The Future of Imprisonment. 1 He then attempts to apply that theory not to the mad defendant but to the halfmad: to the defendant who is not crazy enough to satisfy the legal
test for exculpation on grounds of insanity, but who nonetheless has
committed his crime in part because of mental or emotional disturbance (pp. 129-76). He also deals with exculpation itself- with the
insanity defense (pp. 29-87) - but there his views seem to me less
forcefully defended than they are in the remainder of this thoughtful
volume. In the course of discussing these various topics, Morris also
tries his hand at fiction. Two of the chapters2 are reports of imaginary incidents of violence involving bizarre mental states, which
purport to have been written by the late Eric Blair (George Orwell)
while he was a police officer and magistra~e in Burma in the late
twenties. These alone make superb reading.
Morris's book is an argumentative book in the best sense: he really argues his positions, giving reasons in their support and addressing seriously the criticisms that they have received. There is none of
what one sees all too often in penological debate: the attempt to
defend a view by merely reasserting it and by caricaturing the objections raised by others. It is because the book has the virtue of being

t This review originated in an invitation in March 1983 by Michael H. Tonry to address a
group of his students at the University of Maryland Law School on the subject of"treating like ,
cases alike" in criminal law, and the ideas herein grew out of that stimulating exchange. I am
also indebted to Professor Tonry's own helpful comments, and those of Professor Nils
Jareborg of Uppsala University, Sweden.
• Professor, School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University, Newark, New Jersey. A.B.,
LL.B, Harvard. Professor von Hirsch is the author of DOING JUSTICE (1976) and (with Kathleen Hanrahan) THE QUESTION OF PAROLE (1979). - Ed.
1. N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974).
2. "The Brothel Boy," pp. 7-27, and ''The Planter's Dream," pp. 89-126.
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good argument that I shall succumb to the temptation of arguing
back: my disagreement herein with some of Morris's contentions is
my own attempt to carry the debate a step further. Let me begin,
then, with Morris's central thesis concerning the rationale of criminal sentencing and then proceed to his thoughts on half-madness
and (more briefly) on madness.

I
The debate over sentencing theory in the last decade has focused
in large part on the respective roles that should be given to utilitarian
considerations and to desert in deciding quanta of punishments. The
positions have varied from those giving crime-preventive concerns
exclusive emphasis,3 to those giving preeminence to notions of proportionality and desert.4 The debate is by no means a purely abstract
one: on it turns the choice of factors that a rulemaking body such as
a sentencing commission should use in fashioning its rules or guidelines on the choice of sentence. 5 On a desert-oriented rationale, the
sentence must be based upon the seriousness of the defendant's criminal conduct. The more one moves away from desert and toward
utilitarian models, the greater the entitlement to use factors that are
unrelated to the blameworthiness of the conduct and that concern
instead the likelihood of the defendant's recidivating or the effect of
the penalty in deterring others.
In this debate, Professor Morris has been the primary exponent
of what he calls "limiting retributivism" (p. 161)- namely, a mixed
model somewhere between pure utilitarianism and the more thoroughgoing desert outlook which some of my colleagues and I have
been advocating. 6 In Madness and the Criminal Law, he attempts to
defend his view against the criticisms of those who advocate more
reliance on desert.
Before exploring the differences between Morris and the desert
advocates, it is important to take note of important similarities.
Morris, like the modern retributivists, insists that desert is to be
taken seriously as a constraint on utilitarian pursuits. Throughout
his book, there is a clearly visible thread of argument that desert is a
separate, retrospectively-oriented conception based on the blame3. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 163-73 (1977), reprinted in SEN·
TENCING 205-12 (H. Gross & A. von Hirsch eds. 1981).
4. See, e.g., A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976); J,
Kl.EINING, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT (1973),
5. For a discussion of how one rulemaking agency, the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
Commission, dealt with this choice of sentencing rationales, see von Hirsch, Constructing
Guidelines for Sentencing: The Critical Choices for the Minnesota Sentencing Guidellnes Commission, 5 HAMLINE L. REV. 164 (1982).
6. See generally A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4; R. SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING
BASED ON EQUALITY AND DESERT (1979).
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worthiness of the offender's conduct; that desert and prospectivelyoriented utilitarian notions have to be kept distinct and are in potential conflict; and that the problem of sentencing theory is not to try to
obliterate that crucial distinction but to find the just and proper balance of emphasis between retributive and utilitarian notions (pp.
179-209).7 I could not agree with all this more strongly.
Let us tum, then, to the areas where Morris and the modem desert advocates disagree. I shall spend more space on these issues because they are the ones on which Morris concentrates his own
arguments in this book.
Morris's basic position in sentencing is that desert supplies the
upper and lower bounds within which a penalty may justly be levied;
but that within those bounds, utilitarian concerns - e.g. , the amount
of punishment needed to achieve a socially acceptable level of deterrence - should be decisive. 8 He is attempting to defend this view
here against those, such as myself, who have been urging that desert
be given a more central role in deciding punishments.9 Morris insists that we are mistaken: desert, he says, should properly serve
only as a limiting principle that sets bounds on permissible punishments. It should not.be used as a determining (he uses the less apt
word "defining") principle - one purporting to guide decisions on
actual quanta of punishments. In Morris's words:
Desert is not a defining principle; it is a limiting principle. The concept
of ''just desert" sets the maximum and minimum of the sentence that
may be imposed for any offense and helps to define the punishment
relationships between offenses; it does not give any more fine-tuning to
the appropriate sentence than that. The fine-tuning is to be done on
utilitarian principles. [P. 199].

The reason desert can only be limiting, Morris goes on to argue, is
that none of us has any idea of precisely how much punishment is
deserved for any given category of offense; we can grasp only what
would be manifestly disproportionate in lenience or severity. As
Morris puts it:
When we say a punishment is deserved, we rarely mean that it is precisely appropriate in the sense that a deterrent punishment could in
principle be. Rather we mean that it is not undeserved; that it is
neither too lenient nor too severe; that it neither sentimentally understates the wickedness or harmfulness of the crime nor inflicts excessive
7. Morris thus implicitly rejects the views of those, such as Ernest van den Haag, who
assert that the idea of proportionate punishments can be explained purely in terms of a deterrence calculus or other crime-prevention notions. See van den Haag, Punishment as a Device
for Controlling the Crime Rate, 33 RUTGERS L. REv. 706 (1981). Contra, Goldman, Beyond
Deterrence Theory: Comments on van den Haag's "Punishment as a Device for Controlling the
Crime Rate," 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 721 (1981).
8. This position is set forth in chapter 5 of the book, where Morris presents his general
sentencing theory, pp. 179-209.
9. See generally A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4.

1096

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 82:1093

pain or deprivation on the criminal in relation to the wickedness or
harmfulness of his crime. It is not part of a utilitarian calculus. . . .
The concept of desert defines relationships between crimes and punishments on a continuum between the unduly lenient and the excessively
punitive within which the just sentence may be determined on other
grounds. [P. 198).

Since desert is only a limiting principle, Morris goes on to assert, the
sentencer is not obligated to impose equal sentences on equally deserving (or rather, undeserving) criminals: cases that are like in respect to the blameworthiness of the defendant's conduct may be
treated unlike where necessary for utilitarian ends (pp. 187-96). In
fact, Morris entitles his main chapter on sentencing theory as
"Anisonomy, or Treating Like Cases Unlike."
When one asks whether desert is limiting or determining, however, it is essential to specify: determining or limiting for what purpose? One must distinguish betwen ordinal and cardinal magnitudes
of punishment: That is, between (1) the question of how defendants
should be punished relative to each other, and (2) the question of
what absolute severity levels should be chosen to anchor the penalty
scale. 10 To view desert as a determinative principle in deciding how
crimes should be punished relative to each other does not commit
one to the claim that it is determinative for deciding their cardinal
magnitude.
For modem desert theory, this distinction is critical. Advocates of
desert-oriented sentencing such as myself do not assert that desert is
determinative for all purposes. Rather, our claim is a more restricted
one, to wit: desert is a determinative principle in deciding ordinal
magnitudes, but only a limiting principle in deciding cardinal magnitudes.11 To see what this means in practice, consider the crime or'
burglary. The issues of ordinal magnitude deal with how a particular burglary should be penalized compared to other burglaries and to
other more or less serious crimes. When desert theorists assert that
desert is a determining principle here, they mean that the ordering of
penalties must meet the following two requirements. The first is the
requirement ofparity: criminal conduct of equal seriousness should
be punished equally, with deviations from such equality permitted
only where special circumstances alter the harm or culpability that is, the degree of blameworthiness - of the defendant's conduct.12 The other is that of rank ordering: penalties should be
ranked and spaced to reflect the ranking and spacing in degree of
I 0. I introduced this distinction in A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 90-94. It is elaborated
upon in a recent article of mine, von Hirsch, Commensurability and Crime Prevention: Evaluating Formal Sentencing Structures and 'I7zeir Rationale, 14 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 209
(1983).
11. Id. at 212-14, 219-26.
12. Id. at 212-13, 226-27.
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seriousness among crimes. 13 What desert theorists object to is deciding these questions of comparative punishments on grounds other
than the blameworthiness of the defendant's conduct: for example,
to punish a particular burglar more severely than other burglars not
because his particular crime is any worse but because he is a worse
risk or because giving him a higher-than-usual punishment would
make him an example to others. 14
To espouse this view does not, however, require one to hold that
desert is determinative in deciding cardinal magnitudes. Here,
rather, most modem desert theorists - certainly I - would admit
that desert is a limiting principle only. 15 I do not claim to know
precisely how much punishment an intermediate-level crime such as
burglary deserves, only that punishments beyond a certain level of
harshness or leniency are undeserved 16 But to make that concession
about cardinal magnitude does not in logic compel one to abandon
desert as the principle for deciding relative severities.
This distinction between ordinal and cardinal magnitudes may
seem elementary, but Morris sometimes ignores it in his book. He
seems to hold that desert must either be limiting for all purposes or
determinative for all purposes. He quotes for example, a passage of
mine 17 where I am speaking of how a sentencing commission in writing its guidelines might draw the dividing line on a sentencing grid
between crimes serious enough to warrant imprisonment and those
warranting lesser sanctions (p. 204). I state that cardinal proportionality requires severe punishment such as imprisonment for the most
serious crimes and lesser punishments for the least serious; but that
the notion of a reasonable proportion between crimes and punishments may not be precise enough to determine exactly where to
draw the dividing-line through intermediate-level crimes; and hence
that the rulemaker might properly invoke various nondesert considerations in deciding this latter issue. 18 Morris seizes upon this statement of mine as suggesting some kind of inconsistency with a desert
orientation. In his words:
Professor von Hirsch would thus allow utilitarian considerations
within desert constraints to guide a sentencing commission but would
deny them to a judge. I don't see why, except to protect the elegance of
his thesis or the robe of the judge. [Pp. 204-205].

In fact, my point has nothing to do with theoretical or sartorial
13. Id. at 213-14, 221-30.
14. Id. at 237-44.
15. Id. at 219-26, 230-32.
16. Id.
17. von Hirsch, Utilitarian Sentencing Resuscitated.· The American Bar Association's Second
Report on Criminal Sentencing, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 772, 788 (1981).
18. Id. at 787-789.
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elegance. It has to do with the difference between ordinality and
cardinality. A sentencing commission, within broad limits of cardinal proportionality, might anchor the penalty scale by deciding to
locate the "in-out" (f.e., prison vs. non-prison) dividing line a little
higher or lower on the sentencing grid, so that intermediate-level
crimes such as burglary either receive a short period of imprisonment or a jail or probation sentence instead. 19 But once the scale has
been so anchored, the rulemak.er is required to observe parity among
convicted burglars - and to rank higher or lower on the penalty
scale crimes which are, respectively, more or less serious than burglaries.20 The fact that I may have no precise quantum in mind as
the precise deserved penalty for burglary does not mean I am precluded from insisting that the punishment for burglaries should be
ranked vis-a-vis the punishment for other crimes so as to reflect the
relative gravity of those acts. 21
If one does bear in mind the distinction between cardinal and
ordinal magnitudes, what is Morris's thesis? Morris is saying that
desert is a significant limiting principle in deciding cardinal magnitudes. A penalty system, he is saying, ought not be so inflated or
deflated that penalties cease to bear any reasonable relationship to
the degree of reprehensibleness of crimes. Here, Morris's view does
not seem so different from that of desert theorists. The difference
comes when one deals with ordinal magnitudes. There, Morris is
saying that one need not observe parity in punishment among
equally serious criminal acts, if there are utilitarian reasons for imposing different punishments. And he seems also to take the rankordering principle less seriously than desert theorists would: one
may, for deterrent or incapacitative purposes, punish a few burglars
more severely than most convicted robbers - so long as one is not
being so very harsh as to breach the cardinal limits on the punishment of burglary.

II
Professor Morris's thesis, in my view, faces two main difficulties.
One, internal to his own statement of his thesis, concerns the width
of the desert limits. The other problem concerns the condemnatory
implications of punishment. Let me take each of these issues in tum.
Width of the .Desert Limits
If desert is to be treated as only a "limiting" principle, as Morris
suggests, the question that immediately comes to mind is the breadth
19. von Hirsch, supra note 10, at 219-26.
20. Id. at 225-26.
21. Id.

February 1984]

Equality, "Anisonomy,,, and Justice

1099

of those limits. Is desert to be a significant constraint on utilitarian
punishments, or only some kind of wide outer limit, that merely bars
outrageous disproportion in lenience or severity?
The tendency of theorists who speak of desert as being only a
"limiting" principle is to adopt the latter interpretation. 22 Sentences
are to be decided ordinarily on utilitarian grounds alone, and desert
comes in only as a constraint against extremes: it should be little
more than a protection against, say, inflicting very long prison
sentences on car thieves or burglars, or giving probation to those
convicte~ of the most violent offenses. This is the interpretation proposed by the American Bar Association's Task Force on criminal
sentencing in its 1979 report. 23 I have criticized the Task Force's
report at some length elsewhere;24 suffice to say here that this view is
scarcely an advance over traditional positivism of two decades ago:
the Model Penal Code already had rules against grossly disproportionate sanctions.25
Morris, to his credit, firmly rejects the ABA Task Force's view of
desert as a mere "side constraint" (pp. 202-04).26 This, he recognizes,
would be inconsistent with his own basic insistence on taking desert
seriously. Desert, he argues, must be treated as a significant restraint
on utilitarian punishments, not merely as a rule against unlikely extremes in punishment that defy common sense and the common morality. His words are worth quoting:
There is clearly a difference of emphasis here [between the ABA
Task Force's view and my own] which is not unimportant. My case for
inequality is for mercy and clemency within an ordered system of
justly deserved punishments; it aims at avoiding the severity amounting to tyranny that rigidly insists on equality and seeks to exorcise discretion and mercy from sentencing. It accepts the long tradition of
justice as equality but seeks to moderate it by acceptance of the uncertainties attending our utilitarian purposes in the distribution of punishment and to allow for a slippage of inequality to achieve parsimony in
punishment. The ABA Report seems to go further than this and, insofar as it does, von Hirsch's strictures seem to me well founded. [Pp.
203-04].
22. See, e.g., M. SHERMAN & G. HAWKINS, IMPRISONMENT IN AMERICA: CHOOSING THE
FuroRE 93-109 (1981). For a critique of the book, see von Hirsch, Book Review, 131 U. PA. L.
REV. 819 (1983).
23. AMERICAN BAR AsSOCJATION, TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND
PROCEDURES, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES (1979).

24. von Hirsch, supra note 17.
25. The Code prescribed statutory maxima based on the felony-category of the offense,
and also prescribed that sentences were not to be so low as to "depreciate the seriousness of the
defendant's crime." MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 6.06, 7.0l(l)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
For fuller discussion, see von Hirsch, Book Review, supra note 22.
26. The term "side constraint" is used in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 23, at
19.
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There are a variety of claims here that we shall need to take up later:
that Morris's modified utilitarianism has something to do with "parsimony," "mercy" and suchlike virtues. 27 But it is plain here that
Morris wants desert to play a significant role in the structure of penalties - that it should be more than merely an outer "side
constraint."
So far, so good. The next question, however, is how significant
desert's role should be: how wide or narrow should the desert-based
limits be, within which utilitarian concerns are permitted to operate?
Fairly wide limits - say, a few months' to five years' confinement
for the serious offense of armed robbery - would mean that utilitarian considerations would still play the primary role in determining
the choice of penalty. Narrower limits- say, a range of two years to
three for a first offense of armed robbery - would mean that desert
would carry a greater, perhaps the primary weight in the choice of
penalties.28 Which does Morris prefer, the narrower or the wider desert limits? He does not say.29 I am not speaking here of a mathematical formula. Rather, the problem is that Morris does not even
suggest any principles that would guide one in deciding the latitude
of the desert limits. When he refers to the use of utilitarian considerations for "fine tuning" (p. 199),30 this would suggest rather narrow
limits. Some of his examples, however, suggest otherwise31 - a
broad scope for utilitarian concerns. Without any specification of
the nature of the desert limits or of how those limits might be derived from his theory, one does not know what one is dealing with: a
substantially desert-oriented system, a primarily utilitarian one, or
27. See text at notes 43-53 iefra.
28. The nature of these limits might conceivably be affected by how broadly or narrowly
the prohibited conduct is defined: the desert limits on punishing armed robbery, for example,
might have to be wider the more comprehensively robbery is defined to embrace forcible takings of varying types and shadings of gravity. But supposing one were operating with offense
definitions of a given degree of breadth or specificity, it still needs to be explained how wide or
narrow the desert limits should be for such offenses under Morris's theory.
29. He admits he does not specify the width of the limits. In his words:
I am well aware that I have not defined the proper range fixed for all crimes and for
criminals by the upper and lower limits of undeserved severity and excessive leniency
which exaggerate or depreciate the gravity of the crime. My view is merely that such
ranges exist, that they should be defined as punishment categories in some form such as
that set forth by the Minnesota Sentencing Commission . . . •
P. 205. I doubt, however, that endorsement of the Minnesota Commission's guideline format
would really be consistent with Morris's view. The Commission's guidelines come close to
adopting the desert parity that Morris wishes to reject: there is a recommended presumptive
prison sentence for each cell in the Commission's sentencing grid for which imprisonment is
prescribed, surrounded by a quite_ narrow range of permissible variation. For a fuller analysis
of the Minnesota Guidelines, see von Hirsch, supra note 5, at 180-91, 193-207, 208-10.
30. It is also unclear precisely how that utilitarian "fine tuning" might be accomplished,
given the imprecision of our efforts to gauge the crime-preventive (for example, deterrent or
incapacitative) effects of sentences.
31. See his proposal for the treatment of the crime of purse-snatching, at pp. 194-96, where
he would have a range of probation to six-months incarceration.
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something in between. As a result, Morris's formula for "limiting
retributivism" seems less of a theory than something akin to a party
platform: a broad formula attractive because it accommodates what
are in fact substantially different positions.
Is the more thoroughgoing desert model I have been advocating
less ambiguous than Morris's scheme? Here, we must resort again to
the cardinal/ordinal distinction. Desert theorists, at least as yet,
have hardly done better than Morris in specifying the precise extent
of the limits which desert imposes on the cardinal magnitudes of
punishment.32 But our model calls for considerably more specificity
in dealing with ordinal magnitudes: to meet the requirements of
parity and rank-ordering, crimes will have to be graded according to
their seriousness; normally recommended penalties will have to be
assigned to those gradations; and deviations from those penalties
permitted only in special circumstances related to the harm or culpability of the offender's conduct.33 This will not, in pure theory, provide for a unique set of solutions, since (given the open-endedness of
the cardinal requirements) the penalty scale as a whole could be inflated or deflated to a considerable extent while the relative proportions among punishments were held constant. But in practice, such a
theory will provide substantially more guidance to the rulemakers.
A sentencing commission does not in fact have all that much leeway
in inflating or deflating overall severity levels, without encountering
limits on the availability of prison resources on the one hand and
political constraints on reducing severities on the other.34 Where the
commission's power resides, and where it needs guidance, is in deciding questions of relative severity and in determining how much to
emphasize the gravity of the criminal conduct versus other factors in
deciding who is to be confined and for how.long. It is precisely on
this issue of distribution that the desert-oriented view, with its strong
ordinal requirements, provides definite guidance as to which defendants should be punished more severely, and which less, and as to
what aspects of the crime and the criminal's history should be relied
upon in the guidelines.35 And it is on that crucial issue that Morris
leaves his model so little specified, because he downgrades the ordinal desert requirements and looks only to the much less clear cardinal requirements of desert.
32. See discussion in von Hirsch, supra note IO, at 219-26.
33. Id at 214-19, 237-44.
34. For a discussion of these practical constraints, see id at 225.
35. In Minnesota, for example, reliance on the ordinal requirements of desert were critical
in helping the Commission decide questions of relative severity of punishments. See von
Hirsch, supra note 5, at 180-91.
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The Blaming Implications of Punishment

The case for the ordinal requirements - that is, for equal treatment of the equally undeserving and for ranking punishments according to the seriousness of crimes - rests on the condemnatory
implications of punishment. The reason, according to desert theorists, why the ordinal proportionality requirements must be observed
is that to do otherwise means blaming equally reprehensible conduct
unequally, or blaming less reprehensible conduct more than worse
conduct.36
How does Morris deal with this issue of the reprobative overtones of punishment? He ignores it. To desert advocates who object
to his model as permitting unequal punishment of the equally
blameworthy, his answer is that such arguments are merely circular:
"[T]hey seem to me rather to restate the conflict than to resolve it
against my view" (p. 202).
But the argument is not circular. It can be stated in general terms
as follows:
I. Suppose X is an institution having strong praising or blaming implications, such that the quantum of X distributed to any recipient
connotes how much he is to be praised or blamed for his or her
conduct.
2. It follows that X should as a matter of fairness be distributed
among recipients so as to comport with the degree of praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of the recipient's conduct in the relevant
respect.
3. Therefore if one does not wish to distribute X according to recipients' deserts, one must make one of these two moves:
a. Deny the premise; that is, show that ins~itution X has no such
praising or blaming implications, as customarily understood; or
else
b. Reform institution X so that its praising or blaming implications are eliminated or diminished so far as possible.

Let me give a modest illustration. Each year, the School of
Criminal Justice at Rutgers University awards a certain number of
fellowships and assistantships to graduate students. The fellowships
are explicitly designated as awards, and carry a stipend but no added
work. The assistantships are not so designated, and involve working
with a faculty member. Because of the different character of the two
institutions, our faculty uses different criteria to distribute them. The
fellowships, in virtue of their character as awards, are distributed
according to desert: that is, according to the quality of the student's
past academic performance. The assistantships, however, are distributed according to more utilitarian criteria: since they are viewed
36. See A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 71-72: see also von Hirsch, supra note 17, at 78489.

February 1984]

Equality, "A.nisonomy," and Justice

1103

as jobs, the student's usefulness for and experience in a faculty member's area of research are considered, along with academic grades.
Were a faculty member to propose distributing fellowships similarly,
he would need to argue for changing their character to make them
less of an award and more a form of employment.
Applying the point to punishment, the logic runs similarly. Desert theorists' crucial claim is that punishment is, and ought to be, a
blaming institution - and hence that penalties should be distributed
according to the degree of blameworthiness of criminal conduct. In
order to do that, one must observe the ordinal requirements of desert: to punish equally blameworthy criminal conduct equally, and
to grade severities of penalties so as to comport with the rank-ordering of seriousness of crimes.37 To resist these conclusions, one needs
to deny the premise; that is, to assert that punishment either (1) is
not, or (2) should not be essentially a blaming institution.
Assertion (1 ), denying that punishment connotes blame, seems to
me pretty implausible. The only perceptible difference between a tax
and a fine, for example, resides in the condemnatory character of the
fine; not in the material deprivation, which in both cases is a taking
of money.38 I doubt Professor Morris would wish to deny the blaming character of punishment.
Assertion (2) is not quite so implausible: one conceivably could
say that the blaming element of punishment is an historical relic; and
that one should seek to reform the criminal sanction so as to make it
only a material disincentive against undesirable conduct, with little
or no moralizing overtones. One could argue, further, that disregarding ordinal-proportionality requirements would be a step toward thus reforming the sanction, to be taken along with other
symbolic changes (such as, if one wished to go far enough, even
eliminating morally-laden terms such as "innocence" or "guilt").
This is not merely hypothetical: juvenile-justice reformers in the
United States tried for years to recast the juvenile system so as to
eliminate all traces of moral stigma.
But I wonder if this route would have much attraction for Professor Morris. It might, in the first place, carry utilitarian costs he
would not like: were the criminal sanction to involve only material
deprivation and not much moral obloquy, much higher levels of material deprivation might conceivably have to be resorted to in order
to achieve even a minimal level of crime prevention.39 Second and
37. See note 36 supra.
38. For a fuller discussion of this aspect of punishment, see generally R. W ASSERSTROM,
PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL ISSUES: FIVE STUDIES 112-51 (1980).
39. The link between condemnation and crime-prevention is discussed at greater length in
von Hirsch, "Neoclassicism," Proportionality, and the Rationale for Punishment: 17roughts on
the Scandinavian .Debate, 29 CRIME & DELINQ. 52, 58-59 (1983).
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more seriously, eliminating or downgrading the blame element in
punishment might eliminate desert requirements too well. Not only
might it dispense with the need for parity and rank-ordering in punishments, but it might also dispense with the desert requirement
Morris does wish to keep: to wit, the cardinal-proportionality principle barring absolute disproportion in punishment. After all, the civil
commitment law has had no similar principle, precisely because no
moral stigma has been seen as involved in its sanctions, as Morris
himself has noted (p. 30). No, I doubt that he is any more willing
than 140 to excise the blaming element in punishment. But if that
element is retained, I find it hard to understand how ordinal desert
requirements can justly be disregarded.

III
In support of his sentencing conception, Morris offers some pragmatic arguments concerning existing sentencing practice and the notion of "parsimony." He also mentions the idea of mercy. Let me
consider these issues briefly.
Existing Sentencing Practice: Exemplary Punishments

Judges sometimes impose extra punishment on selected offenders
for deterrent effect. Morris cites the instance of the exemplary sentence imposed on nine white hoodlums convicted of racial assaults
on blacks in the Notting Hill district of London in 1958 (pp. 187-88).
Such a practice, he points out, does not comport with the parity requirements of desert:
It needs no refined analysis to demonstrate that these nine offenders
were selected for unequal treatment before the law. Please do not misunderstand me; I am not opposing such sentences, quite the contrary.
Rather, I am arguing that if the increased penalty is within the legislatively prescribed range, then any supposed principle of equality does
not prevent such a sentence from being in the appropriate case a just
punishment. [P. 188, emphasis in original].

The difficulty with this argument should be apparent: citing the
existence of a sentencing practice does not demonstrate thejustice of
that practice. Yes, judges, when left to their discretion, sometimes
impose exemplary deterrent sentences; they also often impose extra
punishments on the basis of predictions of debatable accuracy. 41
They may also engage in a variety of other practices that are not
necessarily defensible. Such facts, however, no more establish that
40. My own arguments for why the sanction against criminal behavior should involve
blame are set forth in id at 63-69.
41. See von Hirsch, Prediction ofCriminal Conduct and Preventive Co,!finement of Convicted
Persons, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 717 (1972), reprinted in SENTENCING, supra note 3, at 148-74.
For further bibliography, see SENTENCING, supra note 3, at 186.
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exemplary sentences are appropriate than they show that predictive
sentencing is desirable. Some jurisdictions, moreover, have reformed their sentencing systems so as to sharply restrict judges' powers to impose exemplary or predictive sentences. The Minnesota and
Washington sentencing guidelines are examples of this.42 (Surely,
Morris would not permit me to argue that the fact of Minnesota's or
Washington's insistence on desert-parity is, alone, reason for concluding that parity ought to be observed as a matter of justice.)
The Parsimony Argument

Elaborating on his earlier writings,43 Morris asserts that it is
"parsimonious" to impose unequal punishments - that is, to ignore
or downgrade the requirements of desert-parity. Suppose, he says,
that a sentencing commission is deciding what is to be the normally
applicable penalty for second-time purse-snatchers. If parity is not
required, one can give most such purse-snatchers probation and
achieve such deterrence as is necessary by giving a few six months in
jail. He thus would recommend that the commission adopt a probation-to-six-months range as the standard penalty. If equally culpable
purse-snatchers must be punished equally, however, then the commission may, as a realistic matter, have to require that a// of them be
sent to jail for a short period - a less parsimonious result in Morris's
view (pp. 194-96).
The most natural and straightforward response of the desert theorist would be to hold his ground. If blame is and should be so
central to the idea of punishment, then it simply is unjust to impose
unequal punishments on those found guilty of equally reprehensible
crimes; and that inequality remains unjust even when urged in the
name of parsimony. But Morris's argument strikes me as questionable even within his framework of "limiting retributivism." Is it really so obvious that abandoning desert-parity will produce more
"parsimonious" results?
Morris has made his conclusion sound plausible through his
choice of example. People tend to be only moderately exercised
about how purse-snatchers are punished. If we change the example
to a substantially more fear-instilling crime, things may work
differently.
Consider the crime of armed robbery. In devising the penalty for
armed robbery and other crimes, the Minnesota sentencing commission did adopt a strong parity requirement. 44 This meant that when
42. For the philosophy of the Minnesota Guidelines, see von Hirsch, supra note 5. The
text of the Guidelines may be found at 5 HAMLINE L. REv. 395-437 (1982). The Washington
Guidelines are set forth in WASH. REV. CODE§ 9.94A (1981).
43. Morris, Punishment, Desert and Rehabilitation, in SENTENCING, supra note 3, at 256-71.
44. See von Hirsch, supra note 5, at 208-10.
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limited prison resources were taken into account, terms for armed
robbery had to be in the two-to-three year range (depending on the
offender's criminal record), with longer terms reserved for the minority of defendants having quite long criminal records. 45 Suppose
the commission had instead rejected parity. This could have meant
that some armed robbers (say, those deemed favorable risks) would
get shorter terms than Minnesota's two-to-three years. But it would
also have meant that other robbers would get longer terms, and a
few could be visited with extremely long terms. To prevent excessive
severity, Morris might apply his retributive ceiling by, for example,
limiting the prison terms of robbers (other than those with the worst
records) to no more than, say, five years. But if we are speaking of a
commission's realistic choices, as Morris claims he is (pp. 192-93),
how easy would it be to defend such a limit? Once a commission
abandons parity in the treatment of robbery, how e.ffectively can it
defend a maximum of five years when it is practically feasible to
imprison some robbers for ten, fifteen, or twenty years, and when
that may appear to be the more effective exemplary deterrent? The
more one downgrades parity and permits selectivity among those
convicted of a crime of a given degree of gravity, the harder it will be
in practice to prevent the extraordinarily severe treatment of a selected few. As the crime becomes more serious and demands for a
tough response increase, this problem will become all the worse.
The problem of harsher punishment for the unlucky few raises
the question ofparsimonyfor whom? Suppose the penalty for Crime
A has been set atx years confinement and that there are 100 defendants per year convicted of the crime. Suppose that, by abandoning
the parity requirement, one will reduce the penalty for fifty defendants by one-half; keep the penalty the same for another twenty-five;
and double the penalty for the remaining twenty-five. Has one produced a more parsimonious result? That depends on how one defines parsimony. If one counts only the number of defendants, a
larger number get lower punishment than before. Were one to use
the more sophisticated utilitarian criterion of aggregate cost - by
factoring in the amount of penalty-change per person as well as the
number of persons involved - there would be no change in net severity. Were one to adopt the nonutilitarian criterion of considering
the position of potentially the worst-off persons46 - a criterion that
Morris has not hesitated to use in other contexts47 - then the change
does not seem parsimonious at all: instead of facing a punishment of
x years, the potentially disadvantaged defendant faces double that
amount. And his extra suffering - as a separate person with only
45. See id at 176, 192-93.
46. See generally J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
47. See N. MORRIS, supra note l, at 80-84.
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his own life to lead - is scarcely made good by the benefit accruing
to other defendants.
One could continue arguing the parsimony issue, but my last
point can be stated more generally as follows. If one is debating the
relative merits of a more versus a less utilitarian conception of punishment, any claim about parsimony can carry persuasive weight
only if it does not beg the question by adopting utilitarian assumptions itself. The ABA Task Force Report, in one passage, flagrantly
ignored this point by explicitly defining parsimony in crime-control
terms.48 Morris is careful to avoid that obvious pitfall (p. 157), but
his arguments about parsimony still seem to come dangerously close
to assuming the utilitarian notions he is setting out to prove.

The Mercy Argument
Throughout his book, Morris keeps asserting that his scheme is
more "merciful" than a more thoroughgoing desert approach.49 The
claim is not easily responded to, because penologists (including myself) have hardly touched upon the concept of mercy.
In the philosophical literature, however, there has been some discussion. One useful analysis is entitled "On Mercy," written a decade ago by Claudia Card.so Mercy, Dr. Card suggests, is not a
utilitarian concept at all. If a judge reduces an offender's penalty
below the norm for that offense because he or she finds the offender
is not dangerous or would better respond to correctional treatment in
the community, or because the offender is a noted scientist who
needs to be at liberty in order to discover a new cancer cure, these
are prudential reasons for being more lenient but not for acts of
mercy in the commonly understood sense. Mercy, Card contends, is
a conception that is tied to the idea of desert. It involves reducing
the penalty on grounds that go beyond the normal reasons of diminished culpability, but nevertheless are concerned with the suitability
and commensurability of punishment for someone who has been visited by much collateral suffering.s 1
If Card is right - and I think she is at least on the right track then desert advocates should think more seriously than they have
about the issue of mercy. Perhaps there exist a variety of circumstances where one should be permitted to go below the normally applicable penalty on grounds related to mercy. A beginning would be
to consider the appropriateness of reducing the punishment in cases
where the act has visited the offender himself with sufficiently injuri48.
49.
50.
51.

See von Hirsch, supra note 17, at 776-79.
See, e.g., pp. 203, 206.
Card, On Mercy, 81 PHIL. REv. 182 (1972).
Id at 184-87, 201.
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ous consequences. (The German Penal Code, in the context of a law
with considerable retributivist traditions, 52 has an analogous
provision.53)
I find it difficult to understand, however, how the idea of mercy
fits into Morris's scheme. If it is an act of prudence rather than
mercy to fix penalties for utilitarian ends, then how has Morris made
his system more merciful by limiting the scope of desert considerations and expanding the scope of utilitarian ones in deciding the appropriate sentence? Morris has not explained what he means by
mercy, or how mercy is to· be distinguished from other concepts that
he uses (such as parsimony). Without such an explanation, his talk of
mercy strikes me as more rhetorical than illuminating.

IV
While gallons· (nay, barrels) of ink have been spent on the insanity defense, the issue of the half-mad has scarcely been touched.
Professor Morris, to his great credit, opens the issue to debate. 54
However one chooses to define legal insanity, there will be a good
number of defendants who do not satisfy the test of exculpation; who
will thus have to be sentenced; and yet who were suffering from
some degree of mental disturbance when they committed the act.
Such cases of partial disability are apt to be much more frequently
encountered than the very small number of insanity acquittals.
What should be done with such persons? Morris's proposal is, essentially, to scale down the punishment for such offenders on grounds of
their reduced culpability. In his words, "[p]unishment will be reduced by reason of mental illness to the degree to which those imposing that punishment regard the offender's moral culpability as
lessened by his mental illness" (p. 152). I thoroughly agree that this
is the proper conclusion, but question its consistency with Morris's
general sentencing theory. Let me explain why.
1. It is true that partial mental disability reduces a person's culpability. The person is less to blame because his mental troubles
reduce his capacity to exercise judgment and self-control. For that
reason, the half-mad defendant, even if he does not satisfy the test
for legal insanity, deserves less punishment.
2. On a desert-oriented rationale for sentencing, there is no conceptual difficulty in accommodating the half-mad. Desert theory
(notwithstanding Morris's occasional assertions to the contrary)
does not require mechanical equality in punishment for all convicted
52. Weigend, Sentencing in West Germany, 42 Mo. L. REV. 37, 39 (1983).
53. STGB 60. This calls for remission of the entire punishment when the adverse consequences of the act to the actor are sufficiently great.
54. His discussion of sentencing the half-mad is set forth in chapter 4 of the book, pp. 129-

76.
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of a given offense. The parity requirements of desert calls for equal
treatment of equally blameworthy defendants55 and diminished culpability means less blameworthiness. This is not a matter of mercy
either, as Morris asserts (pp. 155-59); the less culpable defendant
deserves and is entitled to reduced punishment. In desert-based
guideline systems, this can be achieved through the presumptive sentence device: while a set quantum of punishment is assigned to each
gradation of severity, the judge retains authority to deviate below
that sentence for mitigating circumstances related to desert. 56 One
such ground for mitigation is partial mental disability. The Minnesota guidelines (which Morris himself quotes on this point (p. 173)),
include the following in the list of mitigating factors warranting departures below the prescribed grid ranges: "The offender, because of
physical or mental impairment, lacked substantial capacity for judgment when the offense was committed." 57
3. On Morris's "limiting :i;etributivism" rationale,58 however, it is
difficult to explain why punishments should be reduced for the halfmad. If desert sets only the upper and lower boundaries of permissible punishment, and if the sentence is to be fixed within those
bounds on utilitarian grounds,59 what room is there for considering
the reduced culpability of the partially mentally disabled? Whether
someone gets a sentence near the top or the bottom of the prescribed
penalty range would, on this theory, depend only on utilitarian factors of incapacitation or deterrence (pp. 196-202). The fact that the
half-mad defendant is less culpable would be irrelevant, since desert
would set only the boundaries of the range, and we are speaking of a
punishment within the range to be decided on crime-preventive
grounds. The half-mad defendant would get a sentence in the lower
portion of the range only if he was a good risk, and was not conspicuous enough to be used as an example to others; and he would get no
less a punishment than a wholly sane defendant who was equally
nondangerous and equally inconspicuous.
4. How, then, does Morris explain his treatment of the half-mad?
His suggestion is that the partially disabled defendant should, in
view of his reduced culpability, receive a sentence in the lower portion of the range - unless there is a strong basis (in the sense of a
55. von Hirsch, wpra note 10, at 244-45.
56. A. VON HIRSCH, wpra note 4, at 98-101.
57. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, MINNESOTA SENTENCING
GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY§ 11.D.2.a.(3) (1981). The mitigating and aggravating factors
listed in Minnesota's guidelines are primarily desert-re1ated. See, von Hirsch, wpra note 5, at
205-07.
58. I am speaking here of the general sentencing theory that Morris sets forth in Chapter 5
of his present book and in his earlier book The Future <ifImprisonment, N. MORRIS, wpra note
1, and which was discussed in Parts 1-111 of this review.
59. See text at notes 8-9 wpra.
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high base-expectancy rate) for believing that he is a poor risk (pp.
146-72). The suggestion is interesting, surely, but hard to square
with his general theory. As just explained, the theory calls for desert
considerations to set only the boundaries of the ranges. And the theory does not ordinarily require such strong evidence of utilitarian
effects when locating the sentence within the range: Morris, for instance, is quite unembarrassed to accept exemplary deterrence on
much flimsier evidence (pp. 187-88).
What Morris's proposals on the half-mad imply, then, is a different general theory of punishment. His suggested treatment of the
half-mad would be consistent with a sentencing theory having the
following features: (1) desert would set the upper and lower limits
of the range. (2) within those limits, desert would have another critical role: the punishment would vary (in an approximate, nonquantitative fashion) with the offender's degree of culpability. (3) the
punishment may be increased within the range on utilitarian
grounds only when there are strong empirical grounds for expecting
significant preventive effects. The reduced punishment to which
half-mad defendants would normally be entitled would then be explainable in terms of their reduced culpability - since degree of
blameworthiness would ordinarily be decisive in deciding the sentence within the range. The insistence on a high base rate expectancy before increasing the sentence on predictive grounds would
also become explicable because of the stricter standard this theory
imposes for using preventive considerations. (I do not know whether
Morris accepts this embryo of a theory - a subsequent lecture by
him suggests not. 60). What is apparent, however, is that this is a very
different conception than a limiting retributivism that relegates desert to defining the range boundaries; and that this theory, by making culpability so important for decisions within the range and by
restricting the use of utilitarian considerations, would give considerably more weight to the concept of desert.
V

Let us tum, finally, to the fully mad and to Professor Morris's
views on the insanity defense. His position is simply stated. A defendant's insanity should be considered, like any other relevant evidence, in determining whether he had the requisite degree of mens
rea - for example, in determining whether he had the intent to
commit the act that the law requires in most felonies (pp. 53-76).
60. "On 'Dangerousness in the Judicial Process,'" lecture by Norval Morris, New York
University Law School (Oct. 18, 1983). In this lecture, Morris broadly endorses use of prediction in sentencing, subject only to validation of the prediction instrument and to upper and
lower bounds of desert. For a critique of his views in that lecture, see von Hirsch, The Ethics of
Selective Incapacitation, 30 Crime & Delinq. - (1984) (forthcoming).
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However, there should be no separate insanity defense. In the
course of developing this abolitionist position, Morris provides a valuable overview of the current debate over the insanity defense, and
furnishes telling criticisms of sillier recent schemes, such as the
"guilty but insane" plea (pp. 83-87).
Should the insanity defense be abolished? Morris rightly reminds us that the debate is not about the principle that punishment
should presuppose blameworthiness. Abolitionists support this principle as do preservationists - they argue only over whether it can
adequately be taken into account through the law's mens rea requirements. In Morris's words:
One is left, therefore, with the feeling that the special defense [of insanity] is a genuflection to a deep-seated moral sense that the mentally
ill lack freedom of choice to guide and govern their conduct and that
therefore blame should not be imputed to them for their otherwise
criminal acts nor should punishment be imposed. [However] . . . it is
important not to assume that those who advocate the abolition of the
special defense of insanity are recommending the wholesale punishment of the sick. They are urging rather that mental illness be given
the same exculpatory effect as other adversities that bear upon criminal
guilt. [P. 59].

What the abolition debate is about, however, is the criteria for
judging the blameworthiness of the mentally ill. To support abolition is to say that the idea of criminal intent61 suffices to express the
notion of the blameworthiness that should be required of any defendant, even a mentally troubled one. To support retention is to
say that, where mad defendants are concerned, having an intent to
commit the act should not be a sufficient condition for culpability;
the defendant's capacity to understand the wrongfulness of his act,
or his capacity for controlling his actions, also matter.62
Who is right? An answer would require deeper exploration of
our conceptions of personal fault. 63 Is the defendant who acts with
apparent purpose but for wholly crazy reasons properly to be held
accountable? Can one make sense of the idea of someone being incapable of exercising self-control, as opposed simply to his failure to
61. Morris notes that abolition of the special defense of insanity would inculpate mad defendants charged with crimes of negligence, since the applicable definitions of criminal negligence do not presuppose personal fault. But if this seems unfair, he suggests, the reason lies in
the inadequacy of those definitions of criminal liability: punishing without requiring personal
fault is unfair not merely to the mentally disturbed defendant but to any defendant. Pp. 70-72.
Morris's solution would be to eliminate negligence liability in.the criminal law altogether. Pp.
70-72. Mine would be to retain it but require that the defendant was capable of comprehending the risk in the circumstances even if he did not in fact consider the risk.
62. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
63. A valuable exploration of these issues is found in Professor Richard G. Singer's recent
review essay on Morris's book. Singer, Abolition of the Insanity JJefanse: Madness and the
Criminal Law (Book Review), 4 CARDOZO L. REv. 683 (1983).
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exercise it? Despite all the debate over insanity these conceptual issues remain to be illuminated adequately.
Morris, unfortunately, does not explore such questions. He contents him.self with stating his preference for abolition in general
terms; with emphasizing that the insanity defense is not important as
a practical matter (because it is almost never used for defendants
charged with everyday felonies); and with asserting that the culpability of mentally disturbed defendants is a matter of degree (pp. 6162). In an otherwise thoroughly philosophical book, Morris never
really reaches the issue of principle: of deciding what it is - the
presence of or absence of intent, the reasons for an act, or whatever
- that might render an insane defendant free from fault. As a result, I do not think he has made a convincing case for abolition of
the insanity defense.
It should be emphasized, however, that Morris's main thoughts
about sentencing do not dep,end on his conclusions about the insanity defense. The abolitionist, just as much as the preservationist,
is free to prefer either a more or less utilitarian conception of how
much to punish those whom the law decides are suitable candidates
for punishment.
VI
I have described Morris's book as argumentative in the best
sense, and have herein been rather argumentative myself. Our
points of disagreement should not, however, obscure the important
points of agreement that I mentioned earlier: on the need to take
desert serious(Y as a principle of punishment; and on the need to face
honestly the tension between retributive and utilitarian concerns in
sentencing. Nor should they obscure the sense I have of the merit of
this ]?ook: it is among the most stimulating works on criminal jurisprudence to have appeared in years.

